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Theology, in the classic Anselmian definition, is faith in search of understanding. In other words, 
it is the work of seeking, rationally and responsibly, to make sense not only of one’s prime 
Christian commitment, but also of the world in which that faith is lived. In the task of thinking 
theologically about identities, allegiances, and discipleship, the stress falls ineluctably on the 
search rather than the answer. In these unwieldy and tangled matters, any claims to a Grand 
Unified Theory are likely to be hubristic.  
Discipleship involves inter alia receiving and owning an identity that has aspects which 
are inseparably—though distinctively—individual and collective. (Tertullian’s famous dictum 
solus Christianus, nullus Christianus comes to mind). The conscious owning and appropriation 
of that identity indicates that being a Christian is also an allegiance, a free choice to take up 
responsibilities. All of that is to say that the three categories of identity, allegiance, and 
discipleship are profoundly interrelated and indeed can all be broadly construed under the 
category of relationship or, to speak in theological patois, koinonia. The complexities, 
 2 
challenges, and gifts of that relationship have to do with the relative importance and claims on us 
of other aspects of our identity—including culture, family, gender, sexual orientation, 
nationality, politics, economics, social class and ideological bents—and the relative possibility of 
integrating them with who we are as Christians. 
En route to Auschwitz in 2006, Benedict XVI told reporters, “We must always learn that 
we are Catholic, and thus that one’s nationality is inserted, relativized, and also carefully located 
in the great unity of the Catholic communion.”1 For “nationality,” one could also substitute many 
other forms of identity and alliegiance. Pope Benedict’s statement raises two questions, 
respectively epistemological and ethical: first, how to understand and evaluate the roles these 
forms of being and concomitant stances before the world, and from there how to “insert, 
relativize and carefully locate” them in one’s own life as well as in the Catholic communion.  
The initial description of the conference at which this paper was originally given stated 
somewhat restrainedly that integrating “multiple and overlapping communities of belonging 
[with] . . . unity in Christ” is  “far from obvious”. Responding to the complex influence of global 
patterns in our contemporary context appears to demand a dauntingly large application of 
theological imagination. Where might we begin? Any number of places in scripture and 
                                                        
1 Quoted in Dorian Llywelyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of Nationality (Lanham, MA: 
Lexington Books, 2010), 16. 
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theological tradition might offer themselves as a starting point for an ethics of identity or 
allegiance. However, to begin with ethics would be to attempt to answer “how should we be?” 
before thinking about “who are we?” To reference the old Irish joke, “if I were you, I wouldn’t 
start from here.” 
  
The problematics of identity 
In fact even before thinking theologically, let alone ethically, about identity, it is worth 
considering about the identity of identity. The question is of course an ancient philosophical 
topos. There is broad consensus, at least in the mainstream of Western thought, that there exists 
such a thing as personal identity, even if agreeing on a list of its essential ingredients is a harder 
task. Part of that difficulty derives from different disciplinary perspectives. There exist vast 
libraries of scholarly writing on the theme, in which philosophers, psychologists, social 
scientists, historians, and anthropologists, as well as theologians all have significant investments, 
while “identity” has also entered the lexicon of popular psychology. Different academic dialects 
and registers do not employ the term in the same manner, and are also likely to be based on a 
variety of lurking and silent anthropological presuppositions. In fact, for theology, dialogue with 
other perspectives on the topic of identity is especially difficult due to the fact that it is not a 
native theological category. “Person,” however is, which at least allows the possibility of 
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thinking theologically about “personal identity.” (The category “social identity,” however, 
presents some challenges for theological thought, as this article will argue below). 
 Clearly, in the Judeo-Christian imaginary, to be a person is to be an image and likeness 
of God. My clone and I would be different persons, even if we shared identical DNA. Even if in 
parallel universes we occupied the same physical space, and shared the exact same thoughts and 
experiences, we would not share the same identity.  To be a person is to be gifted with a 
uniqueness and unrepeatability that is more than physical or psychological, but which exists at 
the most profound level of being. 
One obvious way of defining identity, whether personal or social is by way of 
differentiation and contrast: to be X is not-Y, to me is to be not-you, to be a Democrat is to be 
not-Republican. And from that negative concept of identity derives a relative, negative ethics: 
because I am X, I don’t do Y-things. However, potential problems swarm if we attempt to 
theologize identity this privative sense as our primary lens.  Human identity in Christian terms 
cannot be fundamentally an identity-by-difference, a not-being.  This is especially true for 
Christian identity: we are saved by Christ, rather than not-damned, and primarily saved for, 
rather than saved from. Nor is that religious identity something that is ultimately contingent on 
our moral action or choice. Rather the freedom belongs to God, and the identity is God’s gift, 
bestowed on us in our baptism which conforms us to Christ, in the Church. Where human action 
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is, however, called upon is in appropriating that identity, the work of freely building our 
allegiance to Christ. That certainly includes rejecting all other claims on our ultimate loyalty, but 
this is also, once again, a positive stance: the choice for Christ that brings in its train turning 
away from everything that is spiritually inauthentic and re-ordering our attitudes to and use of 
everything that is not God, so that we may serve and love him in all things.2 
A second popular definition of identity is conformity to a set of defining characteristics. 
Latin@ identity for example, would be defined by one’s having a Spanish name and browner 
skin and speaking Spanish. Clearly, attention to questions of power demands noting a number of 
things here: who compiles that set of characteristics and who is excluded from that process; 
which characteristics are held to be primary and which secondary; and not least, the degree of 
historical variation and evolution that is admitted. 
The doyen of nationality studies, Anthony D. Smith, notes two broad approaches in the 
study of ethnic identity. A “Heraclitean” approach focuses on the emergence and dissolution of 
ethnic identity. “Parmenidean” sensibilities, on the other hand, give weight to those unchanging 
                                                        
2 See the “Principle and Foundation,” Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Based on Studies in 
the Language of the Autograph, ed. and trans. Louis J. Puhl, S.J. (Chicago: Loyola Press, 
1952), no. 23. 
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cultural aspects that identify particular human groups—their religion, way of life, language and 
communal memories, values and territory.3  
Heraclitean skepticism raises important questions for Parmenidean essentialism.  In 
multicultural societies in particular, individual and social identities built on characteristics are 
necessarily fluid and tend toward the fragmented: if someone for example does not speak 
Spanish, or is Jewish, or has a Japanese mother and a Chilean mother, is she still Hispanic, or 
less authentically Hispanic? Personal identity can be navigated and negotiated almost by the 
minute, according to the most salient characteristic: depending on context, a person may 
variously think of herself or be thought of as Filipina, mestiza, a vegetarian, a sister, a judge, a 
Catholic.  
In practice, the more culturally heterogeneous a society, the more the question of identity 
becomes convoluted. One’s sense of self, and how one wishes to be categorized by others 
becomes a matter which shouts out for political attention— and gets it. A self-identity (the notion 
of identity frequently employed in popular discourse) is effect an identity-by-individual-choice. 
Despite his white mother, President Obama has reputedly “checked only the racial box that says 
                                                        
3 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 207. 
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Black, African Am., or Negro.’”4 The overlapping senses of identity of the postmodern denizen 
of a globalized world may also be potentially conflictive. I may hold two passports and have two 
native languages. But will someone I perceived as be fully American if I am Muslim?5 Can 
someone be Catholic in her religious identity at the same time as Buddhist in cultural identity?6  
Such personal questions require careful consideration, and their importance increases by 
geometrical progression when the personal becomes communal and political.  
In the specific case of Christian identity, the logical problem with identity-by-essential-
characteristics is that if all (or most) As are Bs, or if they do B things, the reverse is not 
necessarily true. Typically “Christian” characteristics such as love, joy, peace, patience, 
kindness, generosity, faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control (Gal 5: 22-24) also abound among 
non-Christians, from atheists to Zoroastrians. Clearly, there do exist defining characteristics of 
what it is to be Christian—faith in Christ being the most non-negotiable. But within Christianity 
as outside it, defining what characteristics constitute an identity is problematic. A longue durée 
                                                        
4 http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/04/nation/la-na-obama-census4-2010apr04 
 
5 See, for example, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Not Quite American?: The Shaping of Arab and 
Muslim Identity in the United States (Waco, TX: Baylor UP, 2004).  
 
6 This would be, broadly speaking, a claim for “multiple religious belonging.” See Peter Phan, 
“Multiple Religious Belonging: Opportunities and Challenges for Theology and Church,” 
Theological Studies 64, no. 3, September 2003. 
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historical perspective shows Heraclitean flow as well as Parmenidean stability. Moreover, what 
are characteristic elements of an identity may not necessarily be essential ones. It is, after all, 
possible to be Catholic in one’s allegiance and identity without a strong personal devotion to the 
Virgin Mary. 
 
Mass vs. Count 
The title of this paper refers to identities, in the plural. Whether one speaks of identity or 
identities is not an innocent question, and it is also a potential tare among the wheat. The mass 
noun “identity” is a universal: it suggests an essential unity which has a potentially limitless sub-
hierarchy of related expressions of the one foundational identity. The claim that there is along 
with one faith and one baptism, one Christian identity, however, carries a potential virus: 
conflating unity with uniformity, of identifying one expression of Christian life as the 
overarching model for all. At the opposite pole, where identity is used as a count noun—as in the 
plural “identities”—questions of diversity, difference, pluralism, and anti-hierarchical taxonomy 
occupy our attention. The concomitant danger is fragmentation into atomized identities, which 
champions particularity at the expense of commonality. There, we would have only 
Christianities, Catholicisms, and discipleships. The provocative title of Bart D. Ehrman’s Lost 
Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew emphasizes above all 
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difference, context, and pluralism and subjective viewpoints, and challenges not only the 
hierarchy of ideas and doctrinal orthodoxy but also their very possibility. In a contemporary 
expression of the ancient “the one and the many” question, Ehrman claims that the diversity of 
contemporary Christian practice renders it “difficult to know whether we should speak of 
Christianity as one thing or lots of things, whether we should speak of Christianity or 
Christianities.”7 At the same time he refers, nonetheless, to “forms of Christianity,” and 
“varieties of ancient Christianity,” a plurality he champions under a modern value-concept of 
“diversity.” Clearly, from a Catholic point of view which sees Christianity as essentially one 
faith, such thinking does not easily convince.  
 Over-emphasis on either front—unilateral insistence on unity or difference—lead too 
easily to disengagement from the mission of unity which involves making or making manifest, 
loving relationship. Logically, the practice of koinonia, which seeks to integrate difference 
harmoniously, requires that there be difference to resolve. Hence it seems obvious that Christian 
identity, whether personal or collective does require the existence of a variety of other 
embodiments of that same identity. On the other hand, there has to be some normative essence of 
                                                        
7 Bart Ehrman, Lost Christianities: The Battles for Scripture and the Faiths We Never Knew, 
new ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 2005).  
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Christian discipleship, lest individual expressions of Christian allegiance, personal or collective, 
become so idiosyncratic as to make even the idea of unity impossible.  
 
First Persons 
Another complication in the consideration of identity comes from an important semantic 
slippage. Identity has both individual and social aspects, but we should not assume that they 
function in the same way. What is true of me is not necessarily true of us, or vice versa, and if it 
happens to be true, then it is not necessarily true in the same way or to the same degree. The term 
“social identity” is misleadingly ambiguous. As my birth, upbringing and language are Welsh, 
and those realities are part of how I think, feel and interact with others, then it seems cogent to 
claim that my social identity is Welsh. However when the category “social identity” is used 
collectively to apply to whole groups of people, such as ethnic communities or nations, it often 
has another meaning, one that is related but also distinct. It is the idea that there is such a thing as 
X-ness—manliness for example—, a diachronic and diatopic essence that would be found in 
various degrees in the individuals who currently compose a particular polity, yet which is at the 
same time would not be radically dependent on them for its existence. In other words, this notion 
of social identity posits a collective “us” that is different from and more than the current sum of 
its parts. I have suggested above that some of the secular academic uses of the term “identity” 
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can be broadly approximated to the Christian notion of “person,” which allows us to treat 
“individual personal identity” as a theological category. However, what is harder by far is to 
come up with a theologically responsible way of talking about the second, collective sense of 
social identity. In most Christian theology, a person is an individual human being, not a 
collective. Theologizing about collective social identity—the identity of groups of people as 
groups—is no easy task.8  
One can argue of course that there is one exception: in scripture, dogma and doctrine, 
quasi-personal identity is effectively attributed to the Church. Ecclesiological metaphors for the 
Church include both collective images (“the people of God”), individual terms (“the Bride of 
Christ, the sacrament of salvation”) and epithets which combine both individuality and 
collectivity (“the body of Christ”). The Church is indeed different from the sum of its constituent 
                                                        
8 There exist many historical studies of the inter-relation between religious and other collective 
identities, e.g. Steven Grosby, Biblical Ideas of Nationality Ancient and Modern (Winona Lake, 
ID: Eisenbrauns, 2002); or Philip W. Barker, Religious Nationalism in Modern Europe: If God 
be for us (New York: Routledge, 2009), as well as on Christianity and cultural identity, e.g. 
Faith and Identity: Christian Political Experience, ed. David Loades and Katherine Walsh, 
Studies in Church History 6 (Oxford: Blackwell 1990); Many Are Chosen: Divine Election and 
Western Nationalism, ed. William R. Hutchinson and Hartmut Lehmann, Harvard Theological 
Studies 38 (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1994; or  John Myhill, Language, Religion and National 
Identity in Europe and the Middle East, Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture 
21 (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2008). In Catholic theology, however the topic seems to have 
been studied as a sub-set of theological ethics or political theology. 
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parts, yet exists in and as them. Murkier by far—for doctrinal and political reasons—is the 
attribution of collective personhood to other social groups, such as clerisy or empire. Does the 
term “Christian nation” mean for example anything more than the fact that most of a nation’s 
members profess Christianity? Following Prince Vladimir’s conversion in 988, the inhabitants of 
Kievan Rus’ accepted Christianity, an event referred to in Russian religious literature as “the 
baptism of Rus’.” If this is merely an extravagant poetic trope, no damage is done. However, by 
its very nature, a metaphor tends to be slippery, holding in tension two realities each of which 
tends to want to de-metaphoricize it, dragging imagery into the orbit of literalism. If “the 
Baptism of Rus’” is taken to suggest that this mass conversion wrought an ontological change in 
the Russian nation, conforming it to Christ, prophet, priest and king, and turning it into a 
“kingdom of priests, a holy nation,” then the specter of politico-religious national messianism 
begins to take chilling form. Much then depends, doctrinally and politically, on how 
metaphorical the metaphor of “social identity” is.  
 
Theseus’ Ship on Heraclitus’ River 
Individual personal identity combines fluidity with fixity. My body looks radically different than 
it did 30 years ago, but I experience myself as fundamentally the same “me” as that younger 
man. Theologically speaking, each of us is still the same person that we became when sperm met 
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egg.  However, the interplay of continuity and change does not necessarily play out in the same 
way in the matter of collective identities. The ancient conundrum of the ship of Theseus relates 
how over the course of years that venerable ship was gradually replaced, plank by plank, until 
nothing of the original parts remained. Was it or was it not still Theseus’s ship?9 In theological 
parlance, a communal personal identity such as a nation or a religious group might be called a 
traditio, meaning something handed on for safekeeping. Tradition, in Catholic theology, is both 
the static content of what is received and handed on, and the dynamic act of reception and 
transmission. Understood in this way, a sociocultural traditio both shapes and is shaped by 
individuals. It also depends on them for its continuance: being the last of the Mohicans 
effectively means the end of Mohican being. In this way, individual identities and collective 
ones, and the social and individual aspects of personal identity, cannot really be radically 
separated: there being a “me” implies that there is also an “us,” and vice versa. Discipleship 
involves inseparable identification with allegiance to fellow humans as well as to God. 
Being a Christian is not only a question of who and what one is, but also how one is. 
Ontology begets ethics. The specific modus operandi of Christian identity is faith, which can be 
rendered as “loyalty” or  “allegiance,” or how one lives in relationship-to. It is self evident that 
                                                        
9 See Plutarch, Lives, vol.1, trans. Bernadotte Perrin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1917), 49.  
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the ancient Mediterranean world gave far more weight to the sphere of the communal, the 
collective and the social than is common in our post-Kantian Western context. For practical 
reasons at the least, personal survival meant being dependent belonging to others. Only through 
being rooted—and especially through being perceived by others to be rooted—in extended 
family, kin-group, and place of origin, could one find a place within the warp and weft of the 
wider society. In that world, without an “us,” the self would be sorely diminished: the most 
vulnerable amongst all the anawim were such people as widows or lepers who were de-
connected from the social mainstream.  
But Jesus also replaced the cultural sovereignty of family and clan solidarity with 
belonging to the new, eschatological community of his disciples.10 In the ancient Mediterranean 
world, gathering a following was a common occurrence. A group that gathers for a specific 
common enterprise for a limited time is referred to by some social scientists as a “coalition”. 11 
Jesus however is a founder of a “faction,” one specific kind of coalition that focuses on a leader 
                                                        
10  See Mk 12:50; Mt 19:29; Lk 14:26.  
 
11 See Dennis C. Duling, “Recruitment to the Jesus Movement in Social Science Perspective,” 
chap. in Social Scientific Models for Interpreting the Bible: Essays by the Context Group in 
Honor of Bruce J. Malina, ed. John J. Pilch (Leiden: Brill, 2000). 
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who has a grievance and who gathers around him others—“followers” or “disciples”—who share 
that grievance and who give him their fealty. 
 Loyalty, commitment, and solidarity are the cluster of values that Jesus invites his 
followers to embrace. Primarily, of course, these virtues should be directed to the God of Israel. . 
Jesus himself is praised for his loyalty to God (Heb 3:1-3) and obedience to him (Heb 5:8). But 
Jesus also demanded allegiance to himself and his project. It is worth pausing to consider the fact 
that the word “allegiance” has its distant etymological roots in a Germanic term for “serf.” Time 
spent with Jesus results in seeking to live like Jesus, in the company of others who desire to do 
the same. Being one of Jesus’ faction involves serving God in serving others.  
Matters of service and community raise the central matter of the relationship between 
Christian identity and those other loyalties which may also demand solidarity and commitment. 
The renunciations of family bonds demanded by Jesus do not so much reject other kinds of 
claims on the hearts and minds of disciples as relativize them:  the Jesus-event does not 
necessarily destroy other forms of identity and allegiance. As the Letter to Diognetus famously 
states, Christians are “indistinguishable from other men either by nationality, language or 
customs. They do not inhabit separate cities of their own, or speak a strange dialect, or follow 
some outlandish way of life . . . They pass their days upon earth, but they are citizens of heaven.” 
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12 Aquinas’ dictum that “grace builds on nature” 13 should warn us away from a reactive, 
pessimistic fuga mundi espoused by many forms of Christianity over the millennia. Instead, it 
invites us to live in a certain tension with the world in which tares and wheat grow together. 
The tension between Christian discipleship vis-à-vis other allegiances and forms of 
identity lie touch on some very foundational theological considerations. Paul reminds the 
Philippians that “our citizenship is in heaven.” But at the same time that the Prologue to the 
Gospel of John teaches that “ the world did not know him,” it also affirms that the Word “made 
his dwelling among us.” Christians cannot of course imply reject à parti pris other human 
relationships and institutions. The fact that God has forbidden us to worship the things of this 
world—including our own nations, cultures, and communities—does not mean that we may not 
love them. Rather, our creed demands that Catholics practice judicious discernment about how 
we engage with our other communities of belonging.  
 
Trinity: the real value of real diversity 
                                                        
12 Letter to Diognetus, in The Apostolic Fathers, ed. and trans. Bart D. Ehrman, vol. 2 
(Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003), para. 5-6. 
  
13 See Summa Theologiae I-II, q.111. 
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A foundational tension in being a Catholic Christian “in encounter with institutions that form 
politically salient loyalties and identities in the modern and postmodern world”14 derives from 
the very order of creation. Humans are made in the image and likeness of the Triune God. As an 
earthy creature—adam (man) made out of adamah (earth)15—infused with the breath of God, the 
proto-human has in himself something both of this world and of the world of heaven.  
Trinitarian considerations lend themselves not only to explaining that tension, but also to 
living it well: there is a direct correspondence between how we construe the inner life of God 
and our ideals of human relationship. There is real distinction of persons: Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit are not merely modes of being nor are they parts of God. There is also a unity of love and 
being between those persons.  The standard patristic opinion derived from Augustine is that 
within the Trinity, it is the loving, self-giving relationship between the persons which constitutes 
them as persons. At the same time, Father, Son and Holy Spirit must each be endowed with 
something that belongs to that person alone, in order that it may be freely communicated to the 
other two persons. The primum analogatum of this the human experience of giving and receiving 
love, an act which requires selfhood, in order that one’s self may be freely shared with others, 
                                                        
14 http://worldcath2013.depaul.edu/spirit/index.aspx 
 
15 Gn 2:7. 
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and unity nurtured. If human relationships are to be rooted in justice, and if the Trinity is the 
supreme model of loving, then the existence of an identity which is real in and of itself, rather 
than merely which is not privative) is a logical prerequisite to both justice and charity. There is a 
Trinitarian corollary to the legal principle of nemo dat quod non habet, which is “if you’ve got it, 
love demands that you share it.” 
Naturally, the domestic arrangements of the Trinity are beyond our experience or 
capacity to understand totally, but the notion that the Trinity is the source and model of the 
Church is theologically uncontroversial. Within God, there is identity of nature: all persons are 
fully and co-equally divine. The ecclesial implications are practical and immediate. The Spanish 
proverb goes dime con quién andas y te diré quién eres: tell me who you keep company with, 
and I’ll tell you who you are. In other words, community reflects and makes identity. I would 
like to expand the application of the Trinitarian model of loving—in Bishop Zizioulas’ phrase, 
“being-as-communion”16—beyond the confines of the Church, and to propose it as the model for 
all kinds of relationship which seek to combine legitimately diverse and autonomous elements 
with an essential unity. Where such difference is practiced as Trinitarian communion, it 
strengthens the distinctive identities of the partners, rather than vitiating them.  
                                                        
16 John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood NY: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985). Particularly relevant to this topic are chaps. 1 and 2.  
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If self-giving love is demanded of all humans, as images and likenesses of God, then it 
has to be required a fortiori of Christians. Jesus prays to the Father for his disciples that “they 
may be one, as we are one.”17 Love requires both someone to give it and a recipient. Nothing in 
scripture suggests that love can and should be practiced between individuals alone.  If Trinitarian 
love, involving communion of uniqueness of persons is to be practiced by individual Christians, 
then it can and indee should be also practiced by Christians collectively, who will be known and 
recognized as Christians (our social identity) because of that love. This logic suggests the 
necessity of there being such a thing as a collective Christian being, something is incarnated in 
all individual Christians who are currently alive, yet which is not radically dependent on them for 
its being. In Catholic terms, that someone is the Church, the object of whose charity can and 
should include other communities of identity belonging as well as individuals.  
However, employing the Trinity in this way, as the ideal model of love is limited by one 
important reason: there is a significant difference between being within the Trinity and being as 
it occurs within creation. In the Trinity, being and self-giving are the same thing. In the world, 
this is not so. Within the Trinity, the existence of the persons is always dependent on each other. 
In the order of creation, each of us is certainly morally and practically dependent on other 
                                                        
17 Jn 17:11. 
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people. Aquinas, following Aristotle’s Politics, asserts that human community is not only a 
practical need, but also a prerequisite of human flourishing. 18 However, no person or social 
group is dependent for her or their very being on the existence of any other person or social 
group. Own lives are not ontologically dependent on anyone else’s.  
 But being Christian is a moral process as well as an ontological state. Even though we 
are limited as creatures in how we can mirror the interior life of the Creator, our mission is 
nonetheless to become more like the Trinity. It is important to continue to insist that Trinitarian 
doctrine has significant practical implications when it comes to living out our other identities and 
allegiances as Catholics. Discipleship is made in the crucible that marries universal brotherhood 
with individual personhood. In the Church, diversities between persons and groups are the 
concrete opportunity and the raw material of the building blocks of the body of Christ. That 
tension inheres in the Church itself, at an individual level: “the very differences which the Lord 
has willed to put between the members of his Body serve its unity and mission.” 19   But that 
same potential for unity and disunity exists in Church’s very DNA, in the relationship between 
                                                        
18 See St. Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics, ed. William P. Baumgart and 
Richard J. Regan (Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing, 1988), 282-83. 
 
19 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 873. 
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the Church and the churches. It is out of the particular churches “formed out of them that the one 
and unique Catholic and formed out of them that the one and unique Catholic Church exists.”20 
The coincidence of opposites—unity of nature and difference of persons— exemplified 
par excellence in the metaphysics of the Trinity, presents itself as the ideal of a series of 
analogous relationships, secular as well religious: between individuals and the Church; between 
individuals and any given society; between local (or even separated) churches and the Church; 
and between the various kinds of social organizations and the community of humankind.  In each 
of these binaries, difference and unity should balance each other. Should, rather than do, for each 
of them offers the serious possibility of violent discord as well as harmony.  Within the 
immanent Trinity, the diversity of persons and the undivided unity of the divine nature inhere in 
each other, as co-absolute and co-implicating principles. In the world, although diversity and 
unity are proximate values, each being equally subordinate to salvation, they are also perennially 
susceptible to seeking to become ends in themselves. A myopic over-emphasis on either 
diversity or unity will destroy the possibility of healthy equilibrium between the two. When 
particularity degenerates into particularism, the individual elements become autonomous and 
solipsistic, and communication between people or ideas which are different from each other is 
                                                        
20 Lumen Gentium, 23. 
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avoided or rendered impossible. At the other pole, where there is no or little distinction between 
the parts, loving respect is also precluded; there is no freedom to love when there is there is no 
real other. 
The exemplars of these two dangers are many. One of the neuralgic points of questions of 
nationality, for example, concerns the relationship of particularity to universality. Both political 
and cultural forms of nationalism champion particularity, belonging, and distinctiveness.21  Yet 
giving a disproportionate stress on the cultural uniqueness nation can render unity with other 
societies impossible. Conversely, where unity is confused with uniformity, the value of diversity 
will be downplayed or not recognized. Politically, forms of disunity include aggressive 
patriotism and claims of ethno-cultural superiority. At other extreme, social homogenization has 
many faces: totalitarian, imperialist, and colonialist. Within the Church, forms of atomization 
include heresies and schisms, as well as claims of special divine election. On the other side, 
history shows many attempts at the centralization of ecclesial power and responsibility, including 
the drive to standardize religious practice to such a degree that there is little room for expressing 
particular cultural identities in a world Church. In all of these situations of potential deviancy, 
                                                        
21 The philosophical roots of the drive to particularism are explored in Andrew Vincent, 
Nationalism and Particularity (New York: Cambridge UP, 2002). 
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love patterned on the Trinity will obviate the twin extremes of fragmentation and 
homogenization.  
Within the Trinity, distinct persons and identical nature coincide to complement each 
other. Analogously, we can argue that individual societies (including nations) require the 
existence of the larger principle of the universal destiny of all created things lest they become 
ends in themselves. On the other hand, in order that the large and abstract ideals which universal 
principles represent —“the call of the Gospel to form communities of discipleship across human 
borders and divisions . . . (and) the unity in Christ effected in baptism and sustained by the 
Eucharist”22—may become incarnated, they must be expressed in the particular, the specific, the 
local and the temporal: these are the very arenas where our “natural” identities and allegiances—
with all their tremendous emotional, volitional, and political heft, their potential blessings as well 
as their limitations—must co-exist with our religious hearts and minds. 
 
Son of God and Son of Mary 
Person and nature, the key terms that express difference and unity within God, are of course also 
the building bricks of Christology. In the Christological debates of the early centuries, Christian 
                                                        
22 http://worldcath2013.depaul.edu/spirit/index.aspx 
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thinkers struggled to answer not so much “who do you say I am?” but “what do we say he is?” 
Pressing practical issues forced the impassioned debates: how people understand who and what 
Jesus is has direct effects on how we construe our discipleship, our other commitments, and the 
relationship between the two.  
A brief recap on the question of social identity is useful at this point. As images of the 
Trinity, we are made for communion: solus homo, nullus homo. If we believe that Jesus is fully 
human, then we have to consider his social identity, the role of his political, cultural and 
religious identities in the Incarnation.23 From there, we can proceed to look that the role of our 
political, cultural and religious identities in the scheme of salvation.24  
Clearly, Jesus’ life and death cannot be understood from his own social, political, 
religious, and cultural context—but there is something greater here than mere exegesis. 
According to the popular patristic adage,  “what was not taken up was not healed,” that is, Jesus’ 
human nature—we might argue, his human identity— was part of the Incarnation. But we cannot 
                                                        
23 See John P. Meier’s series A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus (New Haven: 
Princeton UP, 1991-2009).   
 
24 Two important studies of early Christian attitudes about social identity are Steven Grosby, 
“The Category of the Primordial in the Study of Early Christianity and Second-Century 
Judaism,” History of Religions 36, no. 2 (Nov. 1996) and Denise Kimber Buell, Why This New 
Race? Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia UP, 2005).  
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take that to mean that that our salvation requires us to be first-century Palestinian Jews, 
especially since in Christ there “neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free person, there is not 
male and female” (Gal 3:28). In the Incarnation, what is “taken up” and brought into unity with 
Jesus’ divinity is all that is constitutively human. That includes both socio-cultural and individual 
aspects of personal identity.25  
A parallel with Jesus’ gender and our own might help clarify the implications of this for 
Christian anthropology. Gender, like sociocultural identity, is a marker of real humanity.26 
Despite there being in Christ “neither male nor female,” neither Incarnation, nor baptism, nor 
redemption eradicates our or Jesus’ own gender.27 Although Jesus was male, the Incarnation 
surely did not happen “for us men and our salvation” alone.  Rather, what is changed by the 
Christ-event is the significance of gender in the order of salvation: the Incarnation both affirms 
yet transcends the importance of gender The same re-signification, I would argue, has to be true 
for sociocultural identities and allegiances.  
                                                        
25 For a more detailed discussion of this see Llywelyn, Toward a Catholic Theology of 
Nationality, chap. 4.  
 
26 A point famously made in Leo Steinberg, The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in 
Modern Oblivion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 
 
27 Pace Mk 12:25 and parallels, and Mt 19:12. 
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Pope Benedict called for “relativizing” nationality within the Catholic communion. But 
do the Incarnation, the Paschal Mystery, and the presence of the Spirit in the world and Church, 
and the Christian discipleship which is their consequence, do anything to our other identities and 
allegiances apart from relativize them? Gregory Nazianzus expands the insight of Athanasius and 
others (“what is not assumed is not healed”) to affirm that what is united to Jesus divinity is 
healed.28 What might “healing” other identities and allegiances involve?  If indeed “grace builds 
on nature and perfects it,” then intimacy with God does not negate or destroy anything of our 
God-given human nature. Being a disciple may involve choosing to abandoning our natural 
attachments. It certainly involves tempering them, or “locating them and carefully inserting” 
them in our membership of the Church catholic.  But it cannot involve necessarily abandoning 
them as a universal, sine qua non prerequisite, were that even possible.  Rather, grace elevates, 
purifies, brings order where there was disorder, and leads to completion. The transformation 
involved in theosis comes about when divine grace harnesses human effort: grace opens and 
invites into relationship, through our free, careful and loving response to the gift of God, and 
seeks the integral conversion of all aspects of one’s being (Ps 103:1). If we agree that “no 
phenomenon of the finite reality of this world, including human beings, is appropriately 
                                                        
28 Gregory of Nazianzus, Epistle 101 (Migne, PG XXXVII, 181C-184A). 
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understood so long as it is seen apart from its relationship to God,”29 then the command of the 
Shema to “love the Lord, our God, with our whole hearts, and with our whole being, and with 
our whole strength” surely includes all aspects of our identity and all our natural loyalties. 
Concretely, how might Christians respond to other forms of identity and belonging, 
particularly when these are potentially inimical to discipleship? If Christ is the perfect human, 
and then it is to Christ that we must look for the answer. A rough Christo-normative proposal 
such as I am making here involves moving rapidly through several centuries of history of dogma. 
At the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the gathered bishops proclaimed as orthodoxy faith in “one 
and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, one in being with the Father in his divinity, and one in 
being with us in his humanity, . . . one and the same Christ…  to be acknowledged in two 
natures, inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably.  The union between those two 
natures by no means does away with the distinction between them; rather the property of each 
nature is preserved and comes together in one Person.”30 The famous four Chalcedonian adverbs 
were directly targeted at heterodox Christologies. Inconfusedly was a whack across the nose of 
Arianism, which held that Jesus was a semi-divine creation of God. Unchangeably refutes the 
                                                        
29 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Human Nature, Election and History. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
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30 DS, 301-302. 
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monophysite notion that in the incarnation, Jesus’ human interiority was absorbed into his 
divinity, or else by a human nature unlike ours. Indivisibly refutes Nestorianism, which tended to 
envisage the body of as containing two persons, human and divine, with no more than a moral 
link between them at best. Inseparably corrects the docetist belief that Jesus’ divinity became 
unhinged from his at the time of his suffering.  
Chalcedon’s language is abstruse. But its ideas about the “how” of the union of the divine 
and the human in Jesus serve as one useful map of congruity between many other related 
binaries: grace and nature; eternity and historicity; the universal and the local; transcendence and 
immanence; faith and culture; psychology and spirituality; belonging to Christ and belonging to 
the world; and love of God and love of neighbor. The analogues for the views Chalcedon seeks 
to correct are therefore legion. However, rather than suggesting in this article precisely how the 
Church might “respect and celebrate the diversity of its members—many nations, cultures and 
communities—while maintaining a coherent witness to the Kingdom of God that is not 
undermined by more parochial ideologies or priorities,”31 I am going to propose, along the lines 
of the four Chalcedonian adverbs, all of them negative as they are, how not to do this.  
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The problem with Nestorianism is its implications for salvation.  If Jesus did not fully 
take on the human condition, it is hard to see how humans could ever reach intimacy with God. 
A semi-divine savior could only bring out semi-salvation. A “confused” Arian Christology takes 
analogous form in those homogenized socio-religious identities where Christian and other 
loyalties are mashed up into something which is less than the sum of its part, such as integrist 
Catholicism, religious nationalisms or the forms of “civil religion,” in which the Church 
functions as state or the state plays at being church. Such tertium quid position are often too the 
discrete substrate of those positions which reduce redemption to political liberation,32 or faith to 
its expression as social justice.  In such cases, the resulting position tends towards diminution of 
the fullness of salvation: the underlying conviction of Arianism is reticence about the degree of 
God’s action in the world and his willingness to enter into the human condition. “Quasi-Arian” 
projects do not respond to the otherness of the Kingdom which is not of this world. At the same 
time that we remember that “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of 
this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted… are the joys and hopes, the 
griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ,”33 it is also important to note that “earthly 
                                                        
32 Cf. the  “Instruction on Certain Aspects of the “Theology of Liberation,” AAS 76 (1984), 867-
877. 
 
33 Gaudium et Spes, 1. 
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progress must be carefully distinguished from the growth of Christ's kingdom.34  Indeed, 
Christians must “discern carefully between the Reign of God and the progress of the culture and 
society in which they are involved.”35  
In a changeable Christology, redemption would mean leaving behind our humanity. As a 
consequence, Christian discipleship would be unable to find a place in Benedict’s “great union of 
the Catholic communion” for any other than supernatural goods. Since in this scheme, grace 
over-rides nature, pietistic spirituality would wipe out psychology.  Such things as family life, 
marriage, and human affect would lose their legitimate secular value yet not find a place in 
redemption. Changeable soteriologies deny the reality and the autonomy of reason and science, 
or the value of culture. This is Niebuhr’s paradigm of “Christ above culture.”  Here, Christian 
discipleship could be expressed only as a contemptus mundi and collective Christian identity 
would take the form of sect.  
Divisible Christologies have their parallels in divided loyalties. Here, for individuals and 
societies alike church and state, religion and politics occupy different spheres of life, 
hermetically isolated one from another. “I am,” said John Kennedy famously, “the Democratic 
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Party's candidate for president, who happens also to be a Catholic . . .Whatever issue may come 
before me as president, I will make my decision . . .in accordance with what my conscience tells 
me to be the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressures or dictates.”36 
Yet according to Gaudium et Spes, “the earthly and the heavenly city penetrate each other.”37  
That interpenetration is a multi-dimensional and organic relationship—literally a perichoresis—
in which each reality exists “totally through the other; when one goes . . . into the other, without 
merging, but rather creating an interior relationship which does not come about when substances 
are merely joined together.”38 The innate dignity of the human person as image and likeness of 
God, and the God-given nature of human activity render it impossible to cordon off the religious 
and the secular into neatly separate pens, relatively private and public.   
Finally, a separable Christology, in sidestepping the problem of a suffering God, also 
avoids the question of the meaning of human suffering, a necessarily corollary of interpersonal 
engagement. It cannot therefore cannot engage in building solidarity with or among nations, 
                                                        
36Transcript of Sept. 12, 1960, speech to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association. Text from 
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ALL6YEBJMEKYGMCntnSCvg.aspx 
 
37 Gaudium et Spes, 40.  
 
38 J. R. Jones, “Cydymdreiddiad iaith a thir,” trans. in Dorian Llywelyn, Sacred Place, Chosen 
People: Land and National Identity in Welsh Spirituality (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
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communities, and cultures, nor involve itself significantly in encounter with the religiously, 
politically, or cultural other. Under threat of sacrifice, a separable discipleship retreats to a 
pietism that seeks to limit sacrificial love—the self-emptying love of Christ.  
 
Heresies and how to love them 
Far from being a priori exercises in willful stupidity, heresies are the result of faith in 
search of understanding. Like orthodox creeds, they too are the result of seeking responses to the 
question “how should we live?”  In fact, many heresies are not so much wrong as insufficient 
and partial stances, and not infrequently reactive plays when another party has taken just one 
element of the truth too far. So it is important to remember that the four Chalcedonian adverbs 
seek to hold together within one faith a number of tendencies which, when they are embraced too 
enthusiastically or unilaterally, can result in inauthentic discipleship and identity. To that extent, 
mitigated forms of what would be heretical positions were they pushed to an extreme, are 
necessary checks on one another.  
Witnessing to the City of God in the City of Man involves holding in tension a set of 
opposites which are mutually corrective. A legitimate degree of “Nestorian” division between 
the autonomous competencies of church and political community for example, keeps us away 
from the “monophysite” confusions of caesaropapism or theocracy: it is the basis for both 
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religious freedom and the legitimate autonomy of the state. On the other hand, the realms of the 
secular and the sacred require, at least in this word, each other’s presence, so that so that both 
that may live out their legitimate autonomies. The real value of diversity needs to be tempered by 
a real and universal solidarity that may demand renouncing or tempering our attachment to good 
things which we hold dear—such as preference for family, ethnic group, or nation, or political or 
ideological groups—in favor of the common good or the greater good of unity. At the same time, 
in the logic of the Incarnation, there is a perennial value to the scandal of the particular, the soil 
of unity. The tent of encounter with the God who is above all place and time, is the locally and 
the historically particular. Where true particularity degenerates into parochial particularism, it 
loses its virtue. But we should not confuse the two. Particularity derives its theological 
significance from the Incarnation. Its ugly stepsister is mere vulgar ideology.   
St. Teresa of Avila insisted on the importance of keeping before the mind the humanity of 
Jesus.39 The Spanish mystic wrote out of the sapiential experience that Jesus’ divinity is present 
in his humanity and vice versa. It is through the incarnate, particular God that we gain access to 
the Trinity, or in the far older formulation of Athanasius, “God became human so that humans 
might become divine.”40  In other words, in the same dispensation that in Jesus, the 
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interpenetration of the human and the divine opens a gateway to the life of Trinity, then it is in 
the life of the world, in those “things counter, original, spare, strange” that we access the life of 
God.  
Theologically, the world—place of our “other” identities and alliegiance—might be 
defined as “that in which the Triune God is present and can be encountered.”  In the Trinity, 
there is no being without communion, and vice versa. Among the consequences therefore for 
discipleship of the logic both of the Incarnation and also of life patterned after the Trinity is the 
necessity of the other:  Christian discipleship needs the world— those other racial, political, 
cultural, sexual and ideological communities of belonging—much as leaven needs dough in 
order to be able to make bread: without the world, there is no Church; without earth, no salt of 
the earth. The reverse is not necessarily true. Other communities of identity, most political and 
cultural allegiances, do not need the Church in order to exist. Yet without Christianity what kind 
of world would the world be?   
Precisely how we evaluate “Catholicism’s embrace of . . . forms of political/cultural 
identity” in “the call of the Gospel to form communities of discipleship across human borders 
and divisions,” and how we treat those “theological, political and pastoral issues related to the 
Catholic encounter with processes and institutions that form politically salient loyalties and 
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identities in the modern and postmodern world”41 will depend significantly on how we 
understand the relationship between creation on the one hand and Incarnation and redemption on 
the other—as connected moments of the same divine plan, or as radically different interventions 
of God. The primal commandment which God gives to humanity in Gn 1:28ss, “to be fertile, and 
multiply, to fill the earth and subdue it.”  This mission civilizatrice, the prelapsarian cultural 
imperative to make use of the gifts of nature belongs to the original constitution of humanity. 
The eschatological mission given by Jesus is “to make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in 
the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I 
have commanded you” (Mt 28:19-20a) is the fulfillment and full flowering of that Edenic proto-
mission. The specifically evangelical mandate does not supersede the cultural, but rather it flows 
out of it, includes it, and brings it to completion.  
The challenge for the Church involves more than “respecting and celebrating the 
diversity of its members” that late twentieth-century Western obsession. Rather, its mission 
extends beyond the borders of baptism, and is at the same time theological and cultural, political 
and pastoral—inconfusedly, unchangeably, indivisibly, inseparably so. Christian discipleship 
involves keeping together in one solidarity two related missions: earthing the gospel, and 
gospelling this earth, home to many identities and many allegiances. 
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